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Introduction
Scholars of comparative politics and international relations rely heavily on regime
typologies during research. Despite recent arguements that question their versatility and
comparability (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010), scales such as Polity or Freedom House are
usefully leveraged to test arguments about behaviors associated with different types of regimes.
Other scholars rely on qualitative and more nuanced taxonomies of regimes, such as those
proposed by Geddes (2003), Bratton & Van de Walle (1994) or Gandhi & Przeworski (2007).
From these typologies, prevailing theories of state behavior have developed that frequently
characterize regimes in terms of democratic or autocratic. Democracies, for example, are
expected to facilitate cooperative social norms (Putnam, 1993), allocate resources through stable
electoral and party institutions (Iverson & Soskice, 2007; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007; Carey &
Shugart, 1995), and accommodate political dissent by subjecting those institutions to popular
participation and competition (Huntington, 1991). Autocracies, in contrast, are expected to
monopolize resource allocations for an exclusive ruling subset (Ross, 2001; Olson, 1993) and
repress or encapsulate potential political opposition (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Carey, 2006;
Gurr, 1970).
Focusing in particular on the democratic regularity of tolerance for political dissent,
scholars have suggested that the free expression and participation of dissenters within a
democratic electoral system decreases the likelihood of those dissenters resorting to violent
rebellion in order to resolve their grievances Gurr (1970). In his analysis of civil conflict, Gurr
argues that democratic institutions offer mechanisms through which dissent can be channeled
peacefully within a democratic regime. More recent findings do suggest that established
democracies are relatively less-afflicted by violent civil conflict and civil war than non-
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democracies (Lacina, 2006; Hegre, 2002). In contrast to democracies, Gurr (1970) argues that
autocracies use repression in order to prevent and mitigate civil conflict in all of its forms; when
able to, they construct internal monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that are designed to
silence and/or eliminate dissenters before they can foment rebellion. Consistent with this logic,
Hegre‟s (2002) study also found that established autocracies were indeed less likely to
experience civil war than non-autocracies.
While these characterizations of regime behaviors towards political dissent have led
scholars to expect state behaviors that often prove empirically typical, it is well-known that
democratic states do not always behave “democratically,” and that autocratic states do not
always behave “autocratically” as might be expected. When focusing on the expectation of
democratic tolerance for non-violent political dissent, examples abound to demonstrate that
democracies, at times, can and do use tools of repression in order to silence or even eliminate
non-violent dissenters. Historical examples include early democratic Europe‟s repression of
colonial subjects in Africa (Mamdani, 2001), South African repression of Black Nationalist
groups prior to the end of apartheid, and American repression of identified leftist subversives
during the 1950s, as well as civil rights activists during the 1960s. More recently, some
democracies have repressed the activities of nonviolent Islamist groups to varying extents. Laws
passed in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, United States and elsewhere have restricted
and/or banned the activities of specific non-violent Islamist groups for varying reasons, most of
which relate to security issues and the global “War on Terror.” Additional laws have passed in
democratic countries that restrict the practicing of cultural customs often associated with Islam;
France‟s banning of wearing hijabs in public is a prime example.
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This paper does not examine the normative ramifications of “democratic repression,” but
rather investigates what security implications such behavior might have for the states exhibiting
it. Specifically: how might a democracy‟s use of repression against non-violent political
dissenters affect the likelihood of subsequent political violence? Can democracies silence
dissenters as effectively as Gurr (1970) argues that established autocracies are able to? How do
repressed activists groups respond in a democratic environment? In this paper, I use dynamic
network analysis in order to investigate how democratic repression of non-violent activist groups
may be associated with the likelihood of political violence. Drawing on social movement theory,
I argue that when forced to resort to informal channels for reorganization in democracies,
repressed activists are more likely to radicalize and thus support or potentially commit acts of
political violence. Repressed activists are more likely to radicalize because the informal
networks that they resort to overlap with those already being used by other repressed activist
groups, including those that use political violence. As a result, repressed activists establish social
connections with other repressed activists, including those who advocate for or use political
violence. I argue that this phenomenon occurs both domestically and internationally, because the
fluidity of informal networks used by repressed activists transcends borders. As a result,
democratic repression may also lead to an unintended consequence of radicalized activist
proliferation abroad. Finally, I argue that this phenomenon poses a unique problem to
democracies, because they lack sufficient internal monitoring and costly punishment
mechanisms necessary to dismantle informal networks vis-à-vis authoritarian states. Drawing on
evidence gathered from the non-violent Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, I use a comparative case
study approach to analyze the extent of activist repression in four democratic states. I then use
dynamic network analysis in order to study changes in the organizational affiliations of Hizb-ut
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Tahrir members over time. I use this method in order to infer radicalization, and thus likelihood
of political violence.
The paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss repression in a democratic context and
why I expect it to facilitate activist radicalization. In particular, I draw on social movement
theory, organization theory and findings in political psychology in order to propose networklevel mechanisms through which this process can occur. Second, I measure democratic
repression using a comparative case study approach by taking advantage of a natural experiment
with respect to the non-violent Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HBT). By comparing HBT across
four different democracies that have repressed it to varying extents, I am able to gauge how
variation in repression is likely associated with the subsequent behavior of the activist group
membership. Third, I propose a micro-comparative research design that makes use of automated
techniques and dynamic network analysis in order to investigate the effects of democratic
repression at network level. Finally, I conclude with a summary of findings and implications for
future research, as well as public policy towards peaceful activists.
Section 1: Networks, Organizations, and Adaptive Responses to State Repression
Scholars have often approached the study of civil conflict (both peaceful and violent)
from perspectives that aggregate and emphasize the beliefs of political actors at an organizational
level, arguing that actors make rational choices based on these beliefs. Most studies of civil war,
for example, tend to assume that the motivations of rebel groups are given; greed-based models
conceptualize political actors as profit-maximizers (Collier & Hoeffler, 2008; 2004), whereas
grievance models consider the political and economic inequities of political actors as having
explanatory power for their decisions to bear the costs of conflict (Walter, 2004; Kalyvas, 20060;
Gurr, 2000). Comparativists studying non-violent forms of civil conflict often use similar
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approaches. Cohen‟s (1994) study of the breakdown of democracy, for example, conceptualizes
political actors at the party level in terms of their.
While these studies of dissident organizations provide important insights into the
emergent behavior of aggregated political actors, scholars of political psychology and terrorism
have focused increasingly on how such aggregated political actors form, in terms of individual
choices to participate. Specifically, these scholars seek to address the apparent puzzle of why
individuals would agree to bear the costs and risks associated with joining a dissident group
when the likelihood of group-level success in accomplishing stated goals is usually very low.
Most rational choice approaches would suggest that it would be against the individual‟s interests
to do so; rather than personally bearing the costs of participating in civil conflict (whether
peaceful or violent), it would be in an individual‟s best interests to free-ride by allowing others to
bear these costs and still reap any rewards of success.
The costs and risks associated with joining dissident groups, even in democracies, are
high. The Islamist group Al Muhajiroun, for example, demanded significantly more time of its
members, in addition to financial support, than other UK-based Islamist group; moreover,
members of the group faced social stigma and the disownment of friends and relatives due to its
radical views and support for violence (Wiktorowicz, 2004). Yet when it legally operated in the
UK, Al Muhajiroun never suffered shortages of manpower. In fact, Al Muhajiroun leader Omar
Bakri Mohammed boasted that, at times, he was forced to turn away interested individuals. Some
psychologists approach the process of joining radical activist groups at an individual level.
Horgan (2008), for example, argues that individuals can be profiled in terms of various stages of
radicalization which are evidenced by roles that entail varying levels of involvement. At the core
of any dissident group often lie the most ideologically and materially committed members,
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whereas the bulk of the group‟s support comes from a less-committed but sympathetic periphery.
Both Horgan and Wiktorowicz & Kaltenthaler (2006) argue that integral to the process of
radicalization are elites who build dissident groups for rational and purposive ends. These
authors argue that political elites can alter the incentive structures of individuals through a
combination of ideological indoctrination and, more subtly, the building of personal relationships
with fellow group members. Thus the apparently puzzling behavior of individuals bearing the
costly (and potentially deadly) burden of joining a radical activist group might be explained in
terms of manipulated social incentives such as family, friendship, group affirmation and feelings
of community. Elite manipulation of social incentives is also typical of religious cults,
subcultures and other groups that are relatively socially isolated. Recent work by Abrahms (2008;
2006) draws on this argument to explain individual incentives within terrorist organizations;
Abrahms argues that the individual social benefits of participation in a terrorist group betterexplain otherwise puzzling group-level behaviors (such as never-ending terrorism and
anonymous attacks, for example) than do explanations that are rooted in an assumption that the
group always behaves in ways that are consistent with its stated strategic goals.
The aforementioned studies of radicalization and roles of elites in the radicalization of
individuals complement broader studies of the strategic behavior of political actors. Political
elites, according to Wiktorowicz & Kaltenthaler (2006), alter individual incentive structures
through radicalization in order to build their organizational capacity. The group itself may then
pursue more purposive strategic goals, such as control of wealth, political power or the
reconciliation of grievances. But what are the specific mechanisms through which political elites
reach out to individuals? What makes some individuals more susceptible to radicalization than
others? Scholars of social movement theory suggest that social networks are the mechanisms
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through which political elites and the ideological core of a social movement reach out to
potential new members for recruitment (Tarrow, 1998). It is through social networks that
political dissidents organize and recruit. When studying Al Muhajiroun, for example,
Wiktorowicz (2004) notes that established group members often drew on established friendship,
family and student networks in order to recruit new members. Social networks can be
distinguished between formal networks, such as the hierarchal and associational ties between coworkers created through institutions and associations (Wiktorowicz, 2004; Varshney, 2002), and
informal networks, such as friend and kinship ties and. Increasingly, informal networks emerge
from ties established among individuals via internet venues such social networking websites,
web forums, anonymous chat rooms and massively multiplayer online role playing games
(MMORPGs) 1 (Collins, 2007; 2006, Clark, 2004).
Scholars studying dissident political groups (both peaceful and violent) agree that
informal networks are particularly important for recruiting and building organizational capacity
(Collins, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Sageman, 2004). Anecdotally, many of the most
ideologically extreme political and religious groups are comprised largely of immediate and
extended family members and friends. Again, Wiktorowicz (2004) establishes the importance of
informal networks to the Islamist group Al Muhajiroun for identifying and recruiting members in
the democratic United Kingdom. Collins (2007) found similar reliance on kinship ties by the

1

Web-based networks themselves can be distinguished between those that are formal and those that are informal.
It would be a mistake, for example, to assume that all social connections formed through internet venues are
informal. Websites such as Linkedin.com and Facebook.com, for example, can be used both as a component of a
formal institution (such as a component to an organization’s official website), or informally to communicate with
friends, relatives and other social contacts. For my purposes, I generally consider internet-based networks to be
informal if they are not associated with an established formal network, and especially if participation in the webbased venue is anonymous. Anonymous forums and chat rooms, for example, undoubtedly fall within the category
of “informal networks” because they facilitate social networking among individuals without associating them with
institutions or organizations. Formal web-based networks, in contrast, generally are those that have physical
manifestations. If an organization’s official website includes contact information and an office location, for
example, it would certainly be considered a component of a formal network.
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more moderate Islamist groups Hizb ut-Tahrir and Islamic Renaissance Party in the Central
Asian Republics, as well as the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan. From his experiences in Afghanistan,
David Kilcullen (2009) noted that marriage was frequently used by members of the Taliban in
order to build ties with local villages and thus secure loyalty and support.
While political dissidents often use their informal networks for recruitment and political
organization, they also make use of formal networks when operating in permissive environments
(Collins, 2007). For example, scholars studying the group Al Muhajiroun note that the
democratic environment of the United Kingdom permitted the group to establish an official
headquarters and offer formal educational and religious services to the general public; using
these formal channels of outreach facilitated the group‟s attempts to reach broader audiences
among the UK Muslim community and build organizational capacity (Pantucci, 2010;
Wiktorowicz, 2004). Indeed, in permissive contexts such as those of liberal democracies, formal
networks arising from established institutions with routines are extremely important both for
growth and maintenance (Greif, 1994). Political scientists posit that formal organizations, such
as political parties, professional associations and unions, are primary power-brokers in
democracies and also constitute the fabric of civil society (Cusack, Iverson & Soskice, 2007;
Iverson & Soskice, 2006; Varshney, 2002). Indeed, most would agree that formal organizational
structures (such as a core leadership and headquarters) are prerequisite for organizations that
wish to pursue political goals in democratic contexts. Furthermore, the cultural importance of
formal networks in democratic contexts (as argued by Greif, 1994) actually results in the
elevation and separation of one‟s formal networks from one‟s informal networks during the
operations of political organizations. It is a cultural norm in Western democracies, for example,
to frown upon the excessive integration of one‟s formal and informal ties; practices such as
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nepotism, “office dating,” and official solicitation of business or politics in family and friendship
settings are frequently viewed as social faux-pas at best and corruption at worst.
As a result of these norms, political dissidents that operate in democratic contexts seek to
establish organizations that facilitate the growth and outreach of their formal networks.
“Professionalism” is key to the organization‟s appeal in these contexts; despite potentially fiery
rhetoric and extremist views, dissident organizations in democracies still seek to establish
headquarters with offices, official websites that are professionally designed, organizational
routines, hierarchies and otherwise emulate the organizational behavior of other, more
conventional establishments such as political parties and unions (Horgan et. al, 2010; Horgan,
Kenney and Vining, 2010). However, in contexts where they are unable to establish
organizations that facilitate the development of their formal networks, political dissidents must
rely exclusively on informal routes to recruit and organize. In her study of Islamist groups in the
authoritarian environments of Central Asia, Collins (2007) found that Islamist organizations
which utilized inclusive informal networks in particular (defined as those that do not inherently
limit their scope to exclusive identities, such as ethnicity) were generally the most successful at
recruiting new members and organizing.
Political dissidents prefer to organize formally when they are able to and that when they
are unable to (due to a repressive legal environment, for example), they choose to organize via
informal routes. Scholars have also argued that political dissidents adapt their organizational
tactics in response to their legal environments; this process can occur via proactive decisionmaking by the group, or organically through selection. Work by Kenney (2010; 2009; 2007), for
example, demonstrates the rapid adaptive behavior exhibited by militant networks that use
terrorism in direct response to changes in the intensity of repressive actions taken by
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governments that fight them. Following this vein of logic, it is reasonable to assume that when
political dissident groups experience repression levied against their established formal networks,
they will seek to preserve their network ties by reorganizing over informal venues. This
argument is consistent with the empirical findings of scholars studying peaceful and violent
Islamist groups (Collins, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Sageman, 2004). Moreover, this assertion is
strengthened by findings in political psychology that conceptualize political dissidents as social
solidarity-seekers; Max Abrahms (2008), for example, suggests that individuals join militant
groups that use terrorism in order to establish and maintain ties with other like-minded
individuals, who often feel otherwise alienated within their broader societies.
If political dissidents are also social-solidarity seekers, it would be expected that
changes in repression of those dissidents would not likely affect their social ties to one another,
or their interests in establishing those social ties with others similar to them. Thus the disbanding
of an official organization would not necessarily imply disbandment of the network, but would
simply force a change in its venue of manifestation. A recent discussion by Perliger & Pedahzur
(2011:46) of network analysis applied in study of terrorism notes that networks are indeed
distinct from the organizations they often manifest in; they note, for example, findings
suggesting that networks of violent religious groups in the West form long before both their
cause for organization, as well as their actual use of violence (Hoffman, 1999; Juergensmeyer,
2003; Stern, 2004). Such networks almost certainly endure following an organizations
disbandment.
The preceding discussion of networks, organizations and responses to repression of
political dissident groups suggests several important notions that I integrate into my argument.
First, while political dissidents use both formal and informal networks to organize and recruit,
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they prefer to focus primarily on formal networks in permissive environments, such as those of
liberal democracies. Second, as social solidarity-seekers, political dissidents seek to establish and
maintain social ties with other political dissidents. Third, as adaptive entities, political dissidents
are expected to maintain their network ties and build new ones through informal networks when
their formal network structures are repressed and thus untenable. Finally, from my earlier
discussion of regime behaviors, it appears that while democracies are generally more tolerant of
political dissident groups than autocracies, democracies can change their “tolerance threshold” in
response to changing perceptions of security and risk. As a result, democracies sometimes
repress political dissidents that they previously tolerated, and vice versa. As I will later discuss in
the specific case of Hizb ut-Tahrir, this was exactly what happened to many non-violent Islamist
groups during the post-9/11 era. I now turn briefly to how these prior findings relate to my
argument about the effect of democratic repression on the likelihood of political violence.
Because democracies tend to tolerate more extreme ideologies held by political dissenters
than do autocracies, the universe of political dissenters that have established formal
organizations and use formal networks is broader in democracies than in autocracies. In both
democratic and autocratic contexts however, those political dissenters that advocate and/or
practice varying forms of political violence are almost uniformly repressed. Few regimes tolerate
groups that not only oppose the status quo, but also use violent methods to bring about change.
As a result of this regularity, most overtly violent politically dissenting organizations have relied
heavily on informal networks and methods in order to organize and recruit. Exceptions to this
claim would include organizations which grow strong enough to conquer territory, and thus
establish their own formal organizations outside the de facto jurisdiction of other states;
examples include the FARC in Columbia and Tamil Tigers before their defeat in 2009. Other
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exceptions would include organizations that find tolerance and/or support within states other than
the state in which they seek to bring about political change; Hezbollah in Lebanon is a pertinent
example.
Because existing violent activist groups have adapted to the use of informal networks in
order to organize, recruit and pursue their political goals, I argue that non-violent activists whose
formal network structures are dismantled will be more likely to experience radicalization and
thus support or commit acts of political violence. I expect to observe this outcome because when
non-violent activists are repressed, they also reorganize by resorting to the same informal
networks (and particularly internet-based venues) that violent activists are already using for the
same purpose. Thus in attempting to achieve the benefits of social solidarity with other political
dissenters and reorganize, previously non-violent dissenters are more likely to become affiliated
with, radicalized, and/or recruited by violent elites and their organizations through informal
channels than if they had been permitted to continue organizing themselves formally. I formulate
this expectation as the following falsifiable hypothesis:
H1: Repression of peaceful Islamist groups in democracies increases the likelihood of group
members’ association with violent Islamist groups and their membership.
In addition to arguing that democratic repression of non-violent political dissenters is
likely to facilitate their radicalization via provoking association with violent groups over
informal channels, I also propose that the repression of non-violent political dissenters will likely
facilitate their migration internationally. This argument is based on the logic that informal
network venues (especially those that are internet-based) are less bound by borders than are their
formal counterparts. Thus dissident activists who are repressed within one state are expected to
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intermingle with likeminded individuals and groups abroad in order to pursue the benefits of
social solidarity. Therefore, I also propose that:
H2: Repression of peaceful Islamist groups in democracies increases the likelihood of group
members’ migrating internationally
The consequences of democratic repression of non-violent political dissenters is an
important, policy-relevant topic, especially in the post-9/11 era. Evidence supporting my
hypotheses would suggest, among other things, that in order to reduce the likelihood of
extremists using political violence, democratic governments should be careful and err on the side
of tolerance when deciding a “threshold of extremism” that they are willing to tolerate, lest they
inadvertently facilitate the recruitment of violent groups. Evidence supporting my first
hypothesis would suggest a causal mechanism through which a democratic country‟s repression
of a non-violent dissident group would likely result in the subsequent radicalization and possible
participation in violence among the groups membership. Furthermore, evidence supporting my
second hypothesis would suggest that domestic repression of political non-violent dissidents has
international consequences; they are likely to migrate abroad. The subsequent sections of this
paper discuss the two-part qualitative/quantitative research design that I employ to test these
hypotheses. The research design first uses a comparative case study approach in order to
construct my independent variable, which is “level of repression” of non-violent Islamist groups
in a democratic context. I then discuss the construction of my dependent variable using semiautomated data collection methods and dynamic network analysis. The resulting research is a
semi-quantitative comparative case study that investigates how the associations of Islamist group
members change as a function of repression in a democratic context.
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Section 2: Comparing Cases of Democratic Repression in Democracies: Hizb ut-Tahrir
from 2002-2009
To investigate how democratic repression of nonviolent activist groups is associated with
the subsequenlikelihood of political violence, I examine democratic repression of Islamist groups
during the post-9/11 era. Government scrutiny of Islamist groups in democratic countries
increased after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. Rubin (2010)
defines Islamism as “a revolutionary political ideology, parallel to such systematic programs as
communism, fascism, liberal democracy and nationalism.” Islamist groups, according to Rubin,
advocate for the establishment of Islam-based systems of governance and thus tend to reject the
legitimacy all other forms of government. Moreover, these groups also advocate for the
unification of the umma (Muslim community) within a single pan-Islamic Caliphate. As a result
of holding these ideological beliefs within the modern system of states, Islamist groups are
inherently anti-systemic, regardless of their location; even Iran, which has enshrined Islam into
its constitution, has not escaped the criticism of some Islamist movements that believe it to be
too liberal (Samii, 2010).
Whereas Islamist ideology consistently rejects the modern notion of the nation-state,
Islamist groups vary in approach and tactics. Some Islamist groups have openly embraced armed
struggle and are directly responsible for carrying out violent attacks, often in the form of
terrorism (Al Qaeda and Jamaah Islamiyah being prominent examples). Other Islamist groups
mix fiery rhetoric with provisions of indirect support for other Islamist groups that use armed
tactics, thus falling into a nebulous category of organizations that facilitate and sometimes
support the use of armed methods, despite not using violence themselves. The UK-based group
Al Muhajiroun is an example of one such group; Pantucci (2010: 226) has described Al
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Muhajiroun as a “connective thread through most Islamist terrorist plots that have emanated
from the United Kingdom,” while conceding that no Al Muhajiroun members have actually
committed acts of violence in the name of, or as present members of the organization. Violent
Islamist organizations and their supporters have posed a security challenge to modern states, thus
resulting in their widespread repression. Most recent acts of democratic repression against
Islamist groups have targeted those groups identified as being responsible for directly carrying
out or providing material support for acts of political violence. Police actions against the wellknown violent Islamist group Al Qaeda, for example, have occurred in Germany, the United
Kingdom and elsewhere. Al Muhajiroun was banned from the United Kingdom in August 2005,
following charges of inciting racial hatred (a crime in the UK) and alleged connections to the
July 7, 2005 subway bombings in London.
While some Islamist groups are engaged in violent conflict with the states that they seek
to overthrow, many other Islamist organizations eschew violence and use exclusively non-violent
methods to pursue their political goals. Perhaps the most prominent example of these groups is
the worldwide Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation, or Party of Islamic
Liberation). Like other Islamist groups, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HBT) advocates for the establishment of
a pan-Islamic Caliphate and thus rejects the regimes of states in which it operates, whether they
are democratic or autocratic in nature. While HBT advocates for the overthrow of modern states,
it has pledged (and appears to follow) an exclusively non-violent strategy in pursuing this goal.
While some governments have questioned the truth of this claim and allege that HBT provides
support for violent Islamist groups, the clear consensus is that despite its fiery rhetoric, the group
eschews violence for both tactical and ideological reasons. From a tactical point of view, because
the group operates in over 40 countries worldwide, a shift towards violent methods in one
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country will likely precipitate sustained repression of HBT‟s activities globally (Collins, 2009;
Whine, 2006). Ideologically, the group‟s UK-based leader and official website both quote
Koranic scripture in order to argue that the political activism of the Prophet Mohammed himself
was limited to building a political base of support and then seeking Nusrah (assistance and
material support) from those in power, rather than directly engaging in acts of violence (Whine,
2006; Mayer, 2004).
Despite its commitment to non-violent approaches to pursuing its political goals, HBT
has experienced varying levels of repression and constraints on its activities in the countries it
operates. HBT has experienced nearly uniform outlawing in both authoritarian and semiauthoritarian countries, though a few exceptions exist. Most predominantly-Muslim countries
have banned the organization; however, it operates freely in both Indonesia and Malaysia (Baran,
2004). HBT members are especially repressed in the semi-authoritarian Central Asian republics,
where the group is extremely popular and thus perceived as a legitimate threat to secular regimes.
Recent fieldwork on the group by Collins (2007) has found that HBT has experienced violent
repression in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan; association with the group carries
minimum prison sentences of at least three years in all three countries, and many members have
alleged torture. Interestingly, Collins has found that HBT in Central Asia maintains its nonviolent approach to activism despite these challenges and, for the most part, condemns the
overtly violent Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Though as I will later discuss as
relevant to my arguments, Collins notes that factions of HBT in Central Asia may be moving in a
direction towards condoning violent methods in order to “evolve in response to its political
circumstances” (p. 83).
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HBT has posed an interesting conundrum for the many liberal democracies in which it
operates. On the one hand, the group‟s anti-systemic rhetoric and popular perceptions of the
group as being linked to Al Qaeda have led democratic governments to often investigate and, at
times, dismantle the organization and while prosecuting its members. However, most liberal
democracies also recognize that as a non-violent activist group, HBT is exercising free speech
and thus expressing its political dissent in a manner that is typically tolerated. As a result of this
conundrum, democratic countries have leveraged varying amounts of repression against the
group. Some democracies, such as Turkey, have outright banned the group and have for many
years. Other democracies, such as Australia and United States, are far more tolerant of HBT‟s
activism. Still other democracies, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, have changed their
policies regarding the group over the years.
HBT‟s apparent variation in experience within democratic countries is an interesting
quasi-experiment that permits a comparative approach to studying my broader research questions
regarding how a democracies use of repressive measures against political dissenters is associated
with the likelihood of political violence. I have chosen five democracies that have repressed (or
not repressed) HBT to varying extents: the United Kingdom, United States, Australia, Germany
and Turkey. I‟ve chosen to examine the behavior of these states with respect to HBT for the
years 2002-2010. I have chosen these five cases and time period for several important
methodological reasons:
First, four of the five cases that I have chosen are clear liberal democracies during the
time period I examine. From 2002-2009, The United Kingdom, United States, Germany and
Australia were all consistently classified as “free” countries by Freedom House (2010) and
assigned scores of 10 by the Polity IV Project (Marshall & Jaggers, 2010), which is the most
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democratic score possible. Furthermore, each of these countries exhibits an established respect
for freedom of organization, expression and protest (though some relevant exceptions exist with
respect to Germany). My fifth case, Turkey, is more accurately described as a semi-democracy;
Turkey has established democratic institutions and party politics, but has more restrictions on
freedoms of organization and expression than my other three cases. Turkey was consistently
classified as “partly free” by Freedom House and scored a 7 on the Polity IV scale, indicating a
country that might best be described as “mostly democratic,” but not as democratic as the other
three cases I analyze.
Turkey was included in the analysis because it exhibits persistently high repression of
HBT in a mostly-democratic context, and also because studying Turkey permits nesting of my
analysis of democratic repression of activist groups within the broader study of state repression
of activist groups. In particular, examining semi-democratic repression in conjunction will fulldemocracies allows me to build on recent findings by Collins (2007) with respect to the group‟s
activities in semi-authoritarian and fully-authoritarian contexts. While Collins‟ study focused
mainly on differences in the level of success among Islamist groups in repressive environments,
she implicitly discusses the effects of authoritarian repression on Islamist group behavior.
Second, in addition to being comparable in terms of their regime types, these four
countries span the possible range of my independent variable, which is democratic repression.
Scholars have pointed out that studying variation on an independent variable of interest is as
important as studying variation on the dependent variable when using qualitative approaches to
establish causal relationships (George & Bennett, 2005). As I have already discussed, Turkey
exhibited high levels of repression, whereas Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia and the
United States exhibited decreasing levels of repression (in that order).
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Third, apparent within-case variation in the use of repression over time in three of my
four cases enhances my plausible establishment of causation with respect to my dependent
variable, which is group membership‟s likelihood of political violence. As a result, I am able to
use qualitative methods in order to build a small-N dataset which, while insufficient for using
many large-N quantitative techniques, permits me to use basic statistical techniques in order to
measure change over time. The resulting analysis that I present is thus a hybrid quantitativequalitative approach.
Fourth, the analysis of a single activist group across five countries permits me to control
for important factors such as variation in group ideology and (to some extent) tactics. As I have
already discussed, HBT is a worldwide Islamist movement whose country-specific branches
subscribe to the same ideology and use similar, non-violent approaches. Furthermore, it can be
established that HBT is actively functioning and seeks to build its organizational capacity in all
four of my cases. Perhaps the strongest evidence supporting this assertion is the fact that the
official HBT website is offered in only seven languages, which include English, Turkish and
German (in addition to Arabic, Russian, Danish and Urdu) (Baran, 2004). While the movement
has experienced varying levels of success and popularity in each of my cases, I don‟t expect
differences in group size to affect how democratic governments have treated them within my
cases; far more important for the democratic context is whether the group can be directly or
indirectly linked to the use of political violence. For example, despite only having relatively few
members, the violent activities of the Red Army Brigades (also known as the Baader-Meinhof
Group) in Germany resulted in intense and sustained German efforts to eradicate the group and
arrest its members (Aust, 1998). Because HBT in the countries that I study have not been directly
linked to acts of political violence, I believe that differences in group size will not have the same
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importance as they might in a non-democratic context; non-democratic regimes are more likely
to fear being forcefully overthrown by a disenfranchised population which a larger dissident
group could potentially mobilize, in addition to suffering the costs of violent civil conflict.
Fifth and finally, I chose to study HBT in these four countries during the years 2002-2010
because they fall within the post-9/11 era. I chose this range of dates from both a theoretical and
pragmatic standpoint. Theoretically, the relationship between democratic governments and
Islamist groups is expected to be different during the pre-9/11 era than during the post-9/11 era.
Namely, I would expect to observe little variation in the level of repression of these groups prior
to 2002 because Islamist groups had little salience in domestic political discourses of liberal
democracies. Thus I would expect to observe few (if any) actual instances of repressive activities,
which I argue are necessary to drive the theoretical relationships that I have discussed. In
addition to this theoretical expectation, I also argue that examining years prior to 2002 presents a
methodological problem with respect to data collection. Specifically, while HBT has certainly
operated in the states I examine prior to 2002, little information exists about group membership,
activities and other data that would allow me to analyze how group members respond to changes
in the level of repression they experienced. This lack of data is the result of relatively little media
coverage that the group received prior to 2002, as well as availability of fewer digitally archived
source materials. A brief search for materials published in 2000 using the same search terms that
I use for 2002, for example, yielded less than 100 results. This is insufficient for the construction
of my dependent variable (membership likelihood of violence), as few (if any) membership links
could be established.
To summarize, I am studying how repressive measured used by democracies are
associated with the likelihood of political violence in five states with respect to the Islamist
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group HBT from 2002-2010. These cases were selected for purposes of comparability and
context, variation in the independent variable, control of variation in other relevant variables and
for both theoretical and pragmatic reasons with respect to the date range. Drawing on available
research on these five, I construct my independent variable (democratic repression of the group)
as a 1-4 scale variable which I assign to each case-year (as follows) and present the findings in
table 1 and figure 1 (below). Measurement criteria, coding decisions and sources, in addition to
case study overviews of HBT‟s experience in these states appear in Appendix A.
Table 1.1: Repression of Hizb ut-Tahrir across Four Democracies from 2002-2009

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

HBT
Australia
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2

HBT
UK
1
1
2
3
2
2
2
2

HBT
Germany
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

HBT
Turkey
4
4
3
3
3
3
4
4

Figure 1: Variation in Repression of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Four Democracies from 2002-2009
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Section 3: Using Network Analysis to Study Change in Activist Organizational Affiliations
A persistent problem facing many researchers who study civil conflict is a lack of
available data about dissident groups themselves. This problem is especially pertinent to
researchers who study violent civil conflict and civil war; accurate information about secretive
rebel groups tends to be very limited (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009). While data
availability is less of a problem when studying non-violent political dissident groups, their
relatively small size coupled with little previous documentation them makes studying them
difficult without fieldwork. This issue arose while attempting to study HBT; thus far, only a few
researchers have conducted fieldwork on the group. These include Collins (2007) research on
HBT in Central Asia, Wiktorowicz (2004) examination of HBT in the context of its offshoot
organization, Al Muhajiroun, and brief policy analyses based on fieldwork by Whine (2006).
Other studies of the group are limited to broader, state-centered analyses that examine the
group‟s relationship with other groups and state apparatus. I have collected and leveraged this
available information to the fullest extent possible for the construction of the independent
variable. Measuring changes in the organizational affiliations of individual group members is
more difficult. However, digital materials do exist on the group‟s activities in the liberal
democracies I study and thus offer potential source material for studying HBT at an individual
level of analysis. These materials include news reports, web forum posts and information
published by the group itself. This section discusses the approach I take in order to leverage
existing text-based sources to collect and aggregate data about the group‟s membership, as well
as how the organizational affiliations of the group‟s membership change over time. I draw on
these materials to construct my dependent variable, which is strength of member affiliations with
violent Islamist groups.
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Section 3.1 Using Dynamic Network Analysis to Study Group Affiliations of Individuals
Collins (2009) study of HBT in Central Asia concludes that group members leverage
their informal networks in order to organize and recruit. She draws on qualitative interview and
focus-group data that she collected in Central Asian countries in order to support her arguements.
Networks (and social networks in particular) use graph theory in order to represent relationships
between nodes. Nodes may be specified to represent people, organizations, places or things.
Relationships between those nodes (called links) can be conceptualized thematically and in terms
of strength. A social network, for example, portrays who interacts with whom. A dynamic
network, by definition, is a network that is changing; dynamic network analysis is the study of
changing networks (often over time). Furthermore, a meta-network is a network of networks;
studying, for example, how changes in a social network affect a financial network, would
involve meta-network analysis (definitions derived from Scott, 2000). The networks I map for
this study is are meta-network comprising individuals, organizations and locations.
While simple network analyses have been carried out by researchers in a variety of fields
for several decades, the ability to study complex and dynamic networks has only recently been
made computationally feasible (Carley et. al, 2010). Advances in computing power, storage and
bandwidth in the past decade have permitted social scientists to harvest and analyze large
quantities of social data from open source materials; moreover, the development of automated
software and processing techniques have greatly assisted social scientists in the completion of
once arduous collection and coding tasks (Schrodt & Gerner, 2010). This paper leverages these
technologies in order to analyze mass quantities of open-source text materials for the purpose of
measuring HBT group membership affiliations over time. While the focus of the study is
substantive in nature, I am also implicitly investigating the extent to which such open-source

25

materials and automated analytical techniques can assist social scientists in reaching conclusions
about political phenomena.
In order to measure changes in group member affiliations over time, I employ dynamic
network analysis software created and shared by Carnegie Mellon‟s Center for the
Computational Analysis and Social Organizational Systems (CASOS), based at Carnegie Mellon
University. In particular, I leverage the programs Automap (Carley et. al, 2010a) and
Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA) (Carley et. al, 2010b). In brief, Automap is a software tool
that assists users in extracting and pre-processing large quantities of text from source materials
(such as digitalized newspaper articles) for the purpose of preparing it for network analysis.
Automap offers several particularly useful functions including a “named entity extractor” which
assists in identifying the names of individuals, organizations and locations, and a “web-scraper”
program that can mass-archive webpages and save them as text documents. Automap also can be
used to detect links between nodes using a process called “windowing,” which generates links
between entities in a pre-constructed thesauri based on proximity in text. Organizational Risk
Analyzer is a package of software tools that allow the user to construct, visualize and analyze
networks and meta-networks over time. I will describe in subsequent steps how I have made use
of these tools for my research purposes, but first discuss the source materials I have collected for
the analysis.
Section 3.2 Collection of Source Materials for Hizb ut-Tahrir
Among the great advantages offered by automated data collection is the ability to process
massive quantities of raw source materials in the form of text and glean relevant information for
analysis. The data that I am interested in are social affiliation data, and the affiliations of
individuals with organizations specifically. I use these metrics to construct my dependent
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variable (discussed further in section 3.3). In order to collect these data, I leverage a wide variety
and depth of source materials published between the years 2002-2010. I chose these dates both
for the theoretical purpose that state relationships with Islamist groups became more politically
salient following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, and for
methodological purposes of data availability. With respect to the construction of my dependent
variable (membership likelihood of participation and/or support of political violence), source
materials from which to draw on are sparse prior to 2002. For example, a brief search for articles
about the group published in English news sources that are made available by Lexis-Nexis for all
years prior to September 11, 2001 yielded only fewer than 300 articles. In contrast, well over
17,000 articles were published about the group from 2002-2010.
I leveraged article databases made available by Lexis-Nexis and Factiva in order to
archive approximately 18,400 newspaper articles which contain “Hizb ut-Tahrir,” “Islamic Party
of Liberation” (which is HBT‟s English name) and other transliterations (ie “Hizb at-Tahrir,” for
example) in their text. I searched both English and foreign-language news sources; because I am
looking specifically for the proper names of group members, organizations and locations, this
process does not require fluency in multiple languages in order to reasonably carry out.2 Of the
18,400 articles I archived, roughly 7,600 were English articles obtained from Lexis-Nexis news
sources, 2,000 were non-English articles obtained from Lexis-Nexis news sources, and 8,800
were both English and non-English articles (combined) obtained from Factiva news sources.
Furthermore, articles collected for my baseline network year (2002) were roughly 1,100.
Interestingly, published articles that mention HBT peaked during 2005; this was to be expected
because members of the group were investigated (though exonerated) for connections to the
2

The exception includes the names of locations, such as countries; foreign-language variants of locations were
used when constructing location thesauri.

27

2005 London Bombings. Variation in media coverage of the group due to these circumstances
will likely compel me to address possible bias in coverage due to the number of articles
published that discuss the group during a given year, in addition to likely period effects
stemming from the 2005 London Bus bombings. Table 2 (following) depicts summaries of the
news articles that I was able to archive.
Table 2: Articles Collected Using HBT-Associated Search Terms, 2002-2009

Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Grand Total

Lexis English
435
577
792
1880
1142
1021
804
950

Lexis Foreign
114
149
271
487
290
177
373
189

Factiva all*
550
750
1050
2750
1250
1150
650
650

Year
Total
~1099
~1476
~2113
~5117
~2682
~2348
~1827
~1789
~18451

*Rounded to the nearest 50
In addition to the newspaper articles that I have archived, I have also converted all of the
case study references that I used to construct my independent variable into text format and have
included them in the analysis. Several of the published articles include quotes by HBT members,
for example, and one even includes a small list of member names and roles. All of this
information was useful for the techniques I then used in order to detect and extract network data.
Next, I made use of Automap‟s webscraping tool in order to mass-archive webpages and
publically available forum posts on the Hizb ut-Tahir international and country-specific websites
(ie the official Hizb-ut Tahrir Australia). This effort led to the collection of about 11,000 web
pages saved as text files with varying amounts of content. Finally, I was also granted access to
the Dark Web Forum project, which is an effort to mass-archive web forum posts on “jihadi”
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websites; these posts contain user pseudonyms as well as names of some group members. After
examining forums in English I deemed that approximately 93 were HBT relevant, in that the
group was mentioned or referenced by users posting within that conversation thread. These
materials were extracted and saved as text documents.
Section 3.3 Extraction of Named Entities
After sorting my source materials by year published, I used two tools embedded in the
Automap software package in order to extract proper nouns and thus named individuals who are
possibly members of HBT during for all years. The first of these tools, called a Named Entity
Extractor, is a simple program that evaluates text and searches for three types of patterns: strings
of characters that begin with capitalized letters, series of strings of characters that begin with
capitalized letters, and series of strings that begin with capitalized letters, but that are broken by
one non-capitalized word. The third component of this search is useful for finding proper nouns
of organizations such as “International Society of Political Psychology,” for example. Character
string series that are identified as possible candidates are extracted into a spreadsheet, which lists
each unique set of character strings by its frequency. The result is a spreadsheet filled with the
likely names of persons, places and organizations and how frequently those concepts appeared in
the text. This list was about 10,000 concepts long, and contained many false positives (such as
the first words of sentences).
In addition to the named entity extractor, I also generated a complete bigrams list for the
text. A bigram is a consecutive set of two character strings in text. The sentence “See spot run.,”
for example, contains the bigrams “See_spot” and “spot_run.” The N-gram generator program
creates a list of unique bigrams for the entire quantity of text provided, sorted by frequency of
appearance. This feature is enormously useful for identifying regularly-appearing names of

29

individuals. If John Smith was an important figure in the HBT-relevant source materials, for
example, the John_Smith bigram would be expected to appear frequently. Unfortunately, the
bigram list generated for the 1,100 articles published in 2002 was well over 100,000 entries long.
I was able to truncate this list substantially by ignoring all bigrams whose frequency of
appearance was less than two (n ~ 40,000).
After combining the named entity and bigram lists that I used generated, a brief Perl
program to further truncate my list of candidate named entities by only retaining bigrams of
string of characters that are capitalized at their beginning (“John_Smith” would be retained, for
example, while “This_is,” and “not_relevant” would be discarded). The finalized spreadsheet of
bigrams and named entity candidates was roughly 5,000 entries long; this was an entirely
manageable list of likely candidates for a single researcher to analyze. Moreover, I have
confidence that, assuming that all human beings have at least two capitalized components to their
names, I only missed those individuals who were mentioned only a single time throughout the
large quantity of articles and text documents that I examined. From this list of roughly 5,000
concepts, I extracted 1229 apparently unique individuals. 3
Section 3.4 Using Agent Thesauri to Clean and Pre-process Text
Following the extraction of named entities via use of bigram and named entity
recognition software, several steps had to be taken in order to “clean” and preprocess the raw
text material in preparation for network analysis. First, it was necessary to account for variation
in how the roughly 1229 individual‟s discovered appear in the source materials. Newspaper
articles, for example, tend to refer to individuals in three ways: by their full names, by their
surnames only, and by their surnames with titles (ie Mr./Ms./Dr./etc). Because surnames are a
3

Some mistakes and/or failures to attribute two spellings, pseudonyms, etc of the same individual are likely
inevitable, despite subsequent edits to the list.
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common element to all of these ways in which individuals tend to be discussed in news, included
used for surnames that were shared by more than one individual (John_Smith and Jane_Smith,
for example, would be left with their full names intact rather than being erroneously aggregated
into a single “Smith”). Taking these steps helped ensure that the number of links between
individuals and their associated organizations and locations would be most accurately detected.
In addition to preprocessing the names list, variations in the naming of other key entities
had to be accounted for by aggregating them into a single, common concept. Carley et al. (2010a)
refer to this process as building a generalization thesaurus; generalization thesauri are necessary
due to the fact that newspapers use different spellings and/or acronyms for the names of some
organizations and locations. Also, spelling errors occasionally occur in digitalized newspaper
data. Furthermore, because I leveraged news from non-English sources, variations in language
had to be taken into account (primarily for location entities). Thesauri were built using variations
in title, spelling and language for six primary entities of interest: Hizb ut-Tahrir, Turkey,
Germany, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. Automap uses thesauri during
text preprocessing in order to detect variations in spellings/phrasings and replace them with a
single, uniform concept. Example entries appear in table 3 (below):
Table 2: Sample Thesaurus for Turkey and Hizb ut-Tahrir Aliases
alias
Türk
Turkei
Turkey
Hizb-ut- Tharir
Hizb-ut-Tahir

common concept
turkey
turkey
turkey
hizb_ut_tahrir
hizb_ut_tahrir

The example thesaurus entries above would result in the transformation of all occurrences
of the character strings “Türk,” “Turkei,” and “Turkey” into the single string “turkey”
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throughout the entire series of text. The full generalization thesaurus used for this project
(including names) was about 3100 entries, which included named individuals, case study
locations and the primary organization of interest (HBT). Text was preprocessed using the
generalization thesaurus, in addition to several other helpful thesauri made publically available to
correct common spelling errors of country names and “clean” the data by removing certain
symbols, extra spaces between words, and extra breaks between paragraphs.
Section 3.5: Using a Meta-Network to Associate Individuals with Country Branches of HBT
Following the preprocessing of the data, a second thesaurus was built in order to
construct the HBT “meta-network” as it appears during the baseline year of 2002. This task
involved the simple designation of generalized entities as either “agents,” “locations,” or
“organizations.” Automap and ORA were designed to construct meta-networks consisting of
many other kinds of networks, such as “resource” and “knowledge” networks (Carley et al,
2010a); for the purposes of this research, only agents, locations and organizations are necessary.
A simple example of the meta-network thesaurus is provided in table 4:
Table 4: Example of Meta-Network Thesaurus
Common Concept
john_smith
turkey
hizb_ut_tahrir

Meta Concept
agent
location
organization

Using the meta-concept thesaurus, Automap is used to evaluate the entire span of text
provided to it for the occurrence of pre-processed concept strings and properly associate them
with a meta-concept. The program creates “windows” of text in order to establish links between
these concepts (Carley et al., 2010a). A window size is specified by the researcher, which is
usually a unit of text (such as number of words, number of sentences, or paragraphs). Two
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concepts that appear within a specified window size are assigned a link. Affiliation between
these concepts is assumed to be stronger and more reliable as the number of links between them
increase. Thus two individual names, or an individual name and organization name that
frequently appear within a window size can reasonably be assumed to have some affiliation.
For a brief example of this process, consider the three entities “hizb_ut_tahrir,”
“united_kingdom” and “abdul_wahid.” Using a window size of 5 sentences (meaning that links
are created if concepts appear within five sentences of one another), 12 links were found between
“abdul_wahid” and “united_kingdom” and 6 links were found between “abdul_wahid” and
“hizb_ut_tahrir” during 2002 alone. Thus it would be reasonable to surmise that the individual
Abdul Wahid has some associatios with both the United Kingdom and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Indeed, Dr.
Abdul Wahid is a prominent HBTUK member who later became chairman of the HBTUK
executive committee. For demonstrative purposes: using a window size of five sentences, a
rough approximation of the international HBT network from 2002 sources appears in image 1
(following). This network includes links between HBT and individuals, links between HBT and
countries, links between HBT, countries and individuals, and links among individuals who are
linked to HBT (second degree of separation).

Image 2 (following) displays approximated

individuals with at least five links to both the United Kingdom and Hizb ut-Tahrir; thus
approximating the United Kingdom‟s Hizb ut-Tahrir (HBTUK) network. Indeed, independent
verification confirms that several of these individuals are indeed members of HBTUK. This
process was used in order to approximate each country-specific HBT network for the span of
years 2002-2010. The networks of individuals generated through this process form my unit of
analysis, which I refer to as “group membership.” I construct group membership by aggregating
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the individuals identified in each country branch of HBT, using the same generalization
thesaurus techniques in section 3.4.
Image 1: Approximated 2002 Hizb ut-Tahrir International Network

Image 2: Approximated Membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir‟s United Kingdom Branch (HBT network
on left, UK network on right, HBTUK membership in middle)
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Section 3.6: Extracting, Aggregating and Classifying Islamist Organizations
After using automated methods to approximate the HBT organizational network, I then
measured HBT membership affiliations with Islamist organizations over time. This step involved
independent research to compile a list of known domestic and international Islamist
organizations. In order to construct this list, I relied heavily on Rubin‟s (2010) Guide to Islamist
Movements, supplementing with additional materials that I used to carry out my case studies.
From these materials, I constructed a list of 260 known Islamist organizations. The full list of
these organizations and how they were coded appears in Appendix B. Each of these groups was
briefly studied in order to determine whether they use or have used violence in pursuing their
goals. Islamist organizations were then classified on an ordinal variable from 1 to 3 that
describes their use and/or support for violence, as follows:

1: Islamist groups are coded as 1 during a given year if evidence found suggested that the
organization actively eschewed the use of violence (rhetorically, materially, and in
practice). 148 of the 260 Islamist organizations were determined to fit these criteria.
2: Islamist groups are coded as a 2 if evidence found suggested that the organization
embraced and/or supported the use of violence rhetorically and/or materially, but that the
organization itself was not responsible for directly carrying out acts of political violence.
27 of the 260 Islamist organizations were determined to fit these criteria.
3: Islamist groups are coded as a 3 during a given year if evidence was found suggesting
that the organization embraced and/or supported the use of violence rhetorically,
materially, and that the organization itself was responsible for carrying out acts of
political violence. 85 of the 260 Islamist organizations were determined to fit these
criteria.
Following the classification of Islamist groups according to these criteria, variations of
the group‟s names were then populated within a generalization thesaurus, while the groups
themselves were aggregated according to their coding criteria using the same methods specified
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in section 3.4. Table 5 (below) provides a brief example of this process, which was carried out
for all years (2002-2009).
Table 5: Example of Aggregation/Classification of Islamist Groups

alias
Al Muhajiroun
The Saviour Sect
Hizb ut-Tahrir
Hizb at-Tahrir
Al Qaeda
Al Qaida
Milli Gorus
Milli Goros

common
concept
al_muhajiroun
al_muhajiroun
hizb_ut_tahrir
hizb_ut_tahrir
al_qaeda
al_qaeda
milli_gorus
milli_gorus

Level of Violence
2
2
1
1
3
3
1
1

Section 3.7: Expanding the Article Database to Include Islamist Organizations beyond HBT
The next step in constructing the dependent variable was to archive additional source
materials using the available list of Islamist groups as search terms. This step facilitates the
tracking of HBT member‟s organizational associations without biasing the available dataset with
only HBT-relevant sources. While collecting a decade of source materials for 260 Islamist
groups might appear to be seemingly an onerous task, archiving so many articles using available
technologies is now well-within the abilities of a single researcher. Current research at the
International Center for the Study of Terrorism, for example, is making use of over 200,000
articles archived for the Irish Republican Army (Horgan, Kenney & Vining, 2010) over a four
decade period. Thus the final dataset from which HBT membership affiliations will be studied
over time will likely consist of tens of thousands of articles, providing a broad database from
which to establish links.
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Section 3.8: Using Dynamic Network Analysis to Track HBT Member Affiliations Over Time
The final step in construction of the dependent variable is in establishing HBT member
affiliations with Islamist organizations in 2002 using dynamic network analysis, and tracking
how these affiliations change over time. This step requires a combination of three constructs:
1) The aggregated 2002 HBT country-specific membership list
2) The aggregated and classified Islamist organizations list
3) The Islamist organizations article database for 2002-2010
Using these materials, ORA is then used in order to calculate links between the
aggregated HBT membership for each country, and each aggregation of classified Islamist
groups. The resulting data generated are as follows for each country-year:
1) Number of links between cases of HBT membership and non-violent Islamist
organizations
2) Number of links between cases of HBT membership and semi-violent Islamist
organizations
3) Number of links between cases of HBT membership and violent Islamist organizations
These metrics are calculated for the case-specific HBT membership networks for each
year, 2002-2010. The operationalized metric used from these data are proportions of total
organizational links in order to account for differences in total links established for a given year.
The calculation of these metrics will provide aggregated indications of how membership
organizational affiliations change over time with respect to constructed categories of Islamist
groups; thus substantive conclusions can be reached about how the group membership‟s
affiliation with different types of Islamist groups is associated with varying levels of repression.
If the proportion of country-membership‟s total links with violent Islamist groups is found to
increase over two years, for example, it would be considered potential evidence that the
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membership‟s likelihood of violence has increased. At time of writing, the final and concluding
sections of this paper discuss challenges to carrying out these remaining steps, addresses
shortcomings of the research and briefly discusses implications should evidence be found in
favor of my hypotheses.
Section 4: Challenges, Next Steps and Implications of the Research
Section 4.1: Challenges
Computational challenges associated with carrying out dynamic network analyses on text
sources that sum to well over 1 billion characters are to be addressed by making use of available
high-performance computing resources. In this section, I wish to focus on discussing important
methodological challenges that should be addressed in subsequent refinements of the research
design. I have highlighted the most important ones as follows.
First, assuming that proximity in text constitutes true “links” between entities (be they
people, places or organizations) is tenuous. While the pilot analyses I‟ve carried out indeed
indicate that links between entities often do capture true relationships, false positives inevitably
occur. I have attempted to mitigate this problem to some extent by removing individuals, for
example, who should obviously not be classified as part of the HBT membership variable. “Tony
Blair,” for example, was frequently found to be “affiliated” with HBT despite clearly not being a
member of the organization. The more comprehensive solution to this problem, however, is the
independent verification of membership lists by finding evidence suggesting that the individual
is indeed a member of the group. Thus a first and simple (though time consuming) refinement of
this research design is independent verification of the HBT membership thesaurus. This would
involve searching the available source database for the names specified in the thesaurus and
rightly classifying those who are HBT members, while removing the others.
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A second major challenge to this research that is related to accuracy of specifying the
HBT membership network involves availability of articles covering HBT during the span of
years. While 1,100 articles for 2002 is seemingly a broad database to draw from, I was only able
to establish links equal to or greater than five for about 20 individuals. Among the solutions to
this problem will likely be drawing on an expanded article database (including all Islamist
organizations) in order to attempt to expand the verified HBT membership list. In many ways,
this approach is similar that of snowball sampling in field research. In addition, the inclusion of
web-scraped pages and forum posts mitigates this problem to some extent as well.
Section 4.2: Next Steps
At time of writing, the independent variable (democratic repression) has been
measured via case studies for each of the five cases for the period 2002-2010. Also, HBT
membership thesauri have been constructed to approximate the HBT network in each country of
interest. Moreover, Islamist organization thesauri have been completed, coded and used as search
terms for additional archiving of source materials. The archiving of these source materials is
currently underway with expected completion in late June, 2011. At that point, the thesauri
materials are to be used for measuring changes to the country-specific HBT meta-networks over
time for the purpose of gauging how membership affiliations with peaceful, semi-violent and
violent Islamist organizations vary as a function of repressive measures used by democratic
countries.
Section 4.3: Implications
This research has clear theoretical and policy implications. If evidence is found
supporting my hypotheses, it would suggest, among other things, that the use of repression by
democracies does indeed facilitate further radicalization of political activists. In addition, it
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would suggest network mechanisms as having explanatory power in this radicalization process.
From a policy standpoint, confirmatory findings would suggest that in order to reduce the
likelihood of political violence from dissenters, states should not proscribe non-violent activist
groups, regardless of how radical their ideology and rhetoric appears to be. Furthermore,
confirmatory findings might also suggest that in order to decrease political violence in ongoing
conflicts, states might be wise to offer incentives of amnesty to violent political groups that
would be willing to eschew the use of violence and pursue exclusively political routes to their
goals in return; indeed, these approaches appear to have been used during the US-led war in Iraq
with some amount of success, especially with respect to the once-violent Mahdi Army.
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Appendix A: Case Overviews, Sources and Coding Decisions for Democratic Repression of
Hizb ut-Tahrir
A Note on Sources
Academic literature on Islamist groups has grown quickly, especially in the postSeptember 11, 2001 policy environment. Nevertheless, available literature on the group Hizb utTahrir is still mostly limited to policy research. Most of the available academic literature on HBT
focuses on the group in Central Asia, where the bulk of its membership is currently based.
Fieldwork by Collins (2009), for example, examines how the group has adapted to the
comparatively repressive environments in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The policy
research on HBT in democratic countries that I draw on is written from varying biases; work by
Baran (2004) on behalf of the Nixon Center, for example, generally advocates for the group‟s
banning worldwide, whereas work by Mayer (2004) on behalf of PSIO is less critical. I have
sought to examine these sources for consensus of fact. Moreover, I have supplemented this
research with additional primary and secondary source material found in articles published by
HBT itself and in newspaper accounts, respectively. These additional sources appear in footnotes,
while the academic and policy sources I referred to appear in the case study references section.
Criteria Used for Coding of Democratic Repression
1: Evidence that no national legislation was considered or passed during this year that would
have repressed the activities or organization of the group and evidence that law
enforcement/security mechanisms were minimally or not at all used to systematically repress the
activities or organization of the group during the year.
2: Evidence of proposed national legislation against group that was voted upon by a national
legislative body but did not pass and/or evidence of minor law enforcement/security activities
against group, such as focused government monitoring or temporary detainment without
subsequent charges during the year.
3: Evidence of national legislation passed that significantly constrains group activities and/or
evidence of some law enforcement/security activities against group, such as searches and
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seizures of property, levying of fines, or minor prison sentences (less than one year) for violation
of legislation.
4: Evidence of national legislation passed and enforced that bans the group‟s presence
completely and evidence of sustained law enforcement/security activities against the group,
including the arrest of members and use of onerous punishments for group activities, such as
long term imprisonment (greater than one year), physical torture or execution.
Case 1: HTB in Australia
Overview
According to Piggot (2010), the Australian branch of HBT (Hizb ut-Tahrir Australia,
henceforth HBTA) has approximately 200 members, most of whom are university students.
Piggot argues the group‟s relatively small size is reflective of the small but growing Muslim
community in Australia. Like other branches of HBT, HBTA rejects the Australian government
and democracy, instead advocating for Shariah Law and against secularization among Muslims
living in the country. The group maintains an active and regularly updated website 4 and
Facebook page5 and appears to regularly host official events. In 2007, the group planned to host
a “Kalifah (Caliphate) Conference” in order to advocate for the reestablishment of an Islamic
Caliphate; the conference was banned by the city of Sydney because promotional material
appeared to spread anti-Semitic and anti-women material. 6 The group successfully hosted a
second Kalifah Conference in 2010, which attracted approximately 1000 attendees. The group
has since promoted the success of this conference heavily, releasing several relatively well-made
video documentaries covering the conference and other current events. 7 HBTA is led by The
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“Hizb ut Tahrir Australia” Official Website, accessed December, 2010 at: <http://www.hizb-australia.org/>.
“Hizb
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Australia”
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Page,
accessed
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at:
<http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=120013371368260> .
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Smiles, Sarah, 2007. “Council Ban on Islamic Conference.” Article written for The Age. Accessed December, 2010
at:<http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/council-ban-on-islamicconference/2007/01/10/1168105052486.html>.
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“The Struggle for Islam in the West.” Documentary distributed on Hizb ut-Tahrir’s official website. Accessed
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group has been particularly critical of the Australian government‟s mistaken arrest and terrorism
charges levied against the Indian citizen Mohamed Haneef, who is a Muslim. 8 Haneef was
accused of participating in the London Subway Bombings of 2005, but the charges were
subsequently dropped when his involvement was later disproven.
Evidence of Repression
Of the cases I compare, HBTA has undoubtedly experienced minimal state repression
from 2002-2010. Piggot (2010) notes that HBTA “came under the scrutiny of Australian security
services following the London bombings of 2005, but the government has remained satisfied that
the Australian group has not „planned, assisted in, or fostered any violent acts…” (p. 130).
Regardless, Piggot also notes that the group has been continually monitored by the Australian
Security Intelligence Organization (AISO) since 2005. Moreover, the group was briefly
considered for proscription again in 2007 because the government remained concerned with its
activities, and particularly the Kalifah Conference in Sydney (which was banned by the city, but
not by the National Government).9 Overall however, HBTA continues to operate relatively freely
in Australia without major legislation or law enforcement activities having been directed against
it beyond monitoring and brief investigation.
Analysis and Coding
Based on the evidence available, it appears that HBTA has experienced relatively little
repression in Australia. A narrative by Piggot (2010) and an examination of news articles
associated with the group suggest that little to no repressive actions were taken against HBTA
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between 2002 and 2004; thus I have coded the level of repression for these dates as “1.”
Available evidence does suggest, however, that the Australian government began to scrutinize
the group further and investigate whether banning it would be warranted in 2005, following the
London Subway Bombings. Specifically, the AISO‟s decision to continue monitoring the group
has led me to code the group‟s level of experienced repression as “2” for the years 2005-2010.
Additional evidence in support of this decision is the City of Sydney‟s ban of the Kalifah
Conference in 2007; this action was not a national-level decision (which I require for higher
coding designations), but certainly indicates an enduring national wariness towards the group
and thus supports corroborating assertions that the group has been continually monitored by law
enforcement authorities since 2005, thus justifying the coding decision of a 2 for those years.
Thus substantively, HBTA has experienced minimal repression for years 2002-2004, but did
experience slightly more repression from 2005-2010.

Case 2: HBT in the United Kingdom
Overview
Hizb ut-Tahrir‟s United Kingdom branch (henceforth HBTUK) is among the largest
branches in the democratic West; according to Leikan & Brooke (2007), the group has over
8,500 members in the United Kingdom and is generally thought to be the primary headquarters
for the broader organization‟s European branches. HBTUK also runs several front and charity
groups which focus their engagement on specific demographic groups, such as women, college
students and children (Ahmed & Stuart, 2010). Moreover, HBTUK also hosts the broader HBT
media center, known as Khalifah Publications (Schneider, 2006). Like HBTA, HBTUK takes
advantage of social networking media in order to spread its message, recruit potential supporters
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and present a professional visage; the group regularly updates its website 10 and facebook page11
and hosts frequent outreach events, protests and rallies. HBTUK hosted an international HBT
conference in 2009 which drew over 8,000 thousand attendees (Ahmed & Stuart, 2009;
Schneider, 2006). The group was led by radical cleric Omar Bakri Mohammed until Bakri left
the organization in 1996 to form the more overtly anti-Western Al Muhajiroun; Al Muhajiroun
was in turn banned in 2004 for violating anti-terrorism laws, but AM members have since reorganized under various splinter groups (Pantucci, 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2004). HBTUK‟s current
leadership is comprised of highly-educated professionals (Whine, 2006) and adheres to the same
ideological principles as other HBT branches, advocating for a pan-Islamic caliphate while
eschewing any form of participation or compromise within the United Kingdom‟s democratic
system (Phillips, 2008; Baran, 2004). Moreover, the group generally refuses to cooperate with
other Islamist groups it deems as having sought compromise with non-Muslim political elements,
though recently this has begun to change (Whine, 2006). Since experiencing greater scrutiny
after the 2005 London Bombings, HBTUK‟s strategy has been to focus on grievances affecting
the Muslim community (ummah), such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and repression of
HBT branches in Central Asia.
Evidence of Repression
Spyer (2010) writes that throughout the 1990s and early 2000‟s, the United Kingdom was
perceived as safe havens for radical Islamists who had associations with violent Islamist groups
such as al-Nahda in Tunisia and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria; French authorities
sometimes referred to London as “Londonistan.” Since the September 11, 2001 attacks against
the United States, the United Kingdom has cracked down on radical Islamist groups, though it
10

Hizb ut-Tahrir’s official UK website, accessed December, 2010 at: <http://www.hizb.org.uk/>.
“Hizb ut- Tahrir in the United Kingdom,” Hizb ut-Tahrir’s official UK Facebook Page, accessed December, 2010 at:
<http://www.facebook.com/#!/pages/Hizb-ut-Tahrir-in-the-United-Kingdom/110072749022457>
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has generally shown leniency towards HBTUK due to its nonviolent methods. As a result,
HBTUK (like HBTA) was generally permitted to operate openly and freely within the United
Kingdom from 2002-2003 (Ahmed & Stuart, 2010; Baran, 2004). This began to change during
2004 when the government increased its scrutiny of the more radical HBTUK splinter group, Al
Muhajiroun, due to alleged links that the group had to suicide bomber Hasif Anif (Wiktorowicz,
2004). The British government banned Al Muhajiroun under anti-terrorism laws in 2004 and
continued to closely scrutinize the activities of HBTUK (Pantucci, 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2004).
Government scrutiny of HBTUK increased further in 2005, following the London Subway
Bombings. UK authorities announced an intention to ban HBTUK 2005; 12 however upon further
investigation, it became clear that insufficient evidence was available to prove any HBTUK
connections to unlawful activity (Ahmed & Stuart, 2010). Following the abandonment of
government plans to ban the group in 2005, prominent politicians re-raised the issue in 2007.13
Ahmed & Stuart (2010) write that since scrutiny of the organization peaked in 2005, HBTUK
and Islamism in general have become more tolerated as a form of religious expression and no
formal actions have been taken against the group; however, they also note that UK
counterterrorism policy is being reviewed, thus implying that changes could potentially limit
HBTUK activities in the future. Moreover, the UK Home Office has claimed that the
organization “remains under continuous review.”14
Analysis
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December, 2010 at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6267656.stm>.
14
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Like HBA, available evidence appears to suggest that HBTUK‟s experience in the United
Kingdom has been generally uninhibited. I have thus chosen to code the level of repression
experienced by the group as “1” for 2002 and 2003 based on Spyer‟s (2010) suggestion of UK
laxity towards all Islamist groups in the early 2000s. It appears that government and law
enforcement monitoring of the group increased during 2004 concurrently with investigations of
Al Muhajiroun, which eventually resulted in that group‟s banning. I have thus coded HBTUK‟s
level of repression as a “2” for 2004. Repression of the group clearly peaked during 2005,
following the London Subway Bombings when the government announced its intentions to ban
the group. Consistent with my coding rules regarding proposed legal action that is not inevitably
implemented, I have coded the group‟s experience as a “3” for 2005. Previously mentioned
sources concur that since 2005, the group has experienced diminished government scrutiny, but
that prominent elements of the government continue to advocate for its banning and continue to
monitor its activities. Thus I code the group‟s experience as a “2” for the years 2006-2010. These
coding decisions were made in recognition that, despite continued unpopularity among broader
British society, it appears that the group‟s activities are mostly tolerated as peaceful religious
expression following exoneration of any role in the 2005 London Bombings. Evidence that the
group has moderated its image to some extent from 2006 onwards also appears to suggest that
any future government actions against the activities of Islamist groups might be less likely to
target HBTUK, although it continues to be monitored (Whine, 2006).
Case 3: HBT in Germany
Overview
Estimates of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Germany (henceforth HBTG)‟s membership as of 2005
range from between about 150 and 300 (Steinberg, 2010; Schneider, 2006). Baran (2004) writes
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that most HBTG members are Arab university students, which is consistent with the membership
base of HBTA and, to a lesser extent, HBTUK. The experience of HBTG differs drastically from
those of HBTA and HBTUK; HBTG has come under especially intense scrutiny in Germany
relative to other European countries as a result of its anti-Semitic views. It was also established
that one of the September 11, 2001 airplane hijackers was a former student who had connections
to HBTG members (Whine, 2006; Baran, 2004). However, subsequent investigations failed to
find evidence suggesting any involvement of HBTG itself in the attacks, or that HBTG members
had encouraged them. 15 Steinberg (2010) writes that before being banned in 2003, the party‟s
main activities were meetings at universities and the publication of a monthly magazine; he notes
that since being banned, the group has generally not sponsored any public activities. HBTG does
not appear to have its own facebook page or Germany-based website, though (as I have
previously discussed), the HBT international website is available in German. I was unable to find
information about HBTG‟s organizational or leadership structure, likely because of the group‟s
secretive nature. Schneider (2006) and Baran (2004) both concur that following proscription in
2003, HBTG continued to operate, but in secret. Baran (2004: 40) writes that:
“Security services have concluded that in Germany, HT [HBTG] appears as a
secret society, kept up only through personal contacts, which are based on shared
ideology. Following the ban, the organization does not conduct any public
activities in Germany and has stopped the German edition of Explizit [HBTG‟s
monthly publication]. Nevertheless, HT continues to recruit and raise funds”
Schneider (2006) notes that after being banned, HBTG continued to recruit and spread its
message exclusively over three German-registered websites; Germany authorities later closed
15
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these websites and pressed charges against the owner. Since then, HBTG has resorted to using
websites registered in other countries, where the group remains legal. Schneider (2006: 74)
writes that “the group also owns forums and chat rooms, in which idealistic Islamic ideology is
advocated and praised.” These findings strongly suggest that since being banned in 2003, HBTG
has indeed adapted by focusing exclusively on the use of informal networking routes, as formal
networks are no longer available to it. Little additional information is available about HBTG in
more recent years, probably due to ongoing German prohibition of its formal activities. However,
in 2008, representatives of the group filed an appeal against its proscription to the European
Court; it appears at time of writing that this appeal has yet to be deliberated.16
Evidence of Repression
Evidence of repressive activities against HBTG is abundant. Steinberg (2010: 464) writes
that HBTG was banned from public activities by the German Interior Ministry in 2003 for acting
“against the idea of international understanding,” though he argues that the more likely reason
for the group‟s banning was a controversial meeting that was attended by members of Germany‟s
right-wing extremist National Democratic Party of Germany. Indeed, Baran (2004: 38) notes that
HBTG‟s ban in 2003 was made possible by “Germany‟s historic circumstances and the laws
passed accordingly, especially with regard to anti-Semitism.” Specifically, Germany‟s “Act
Governing Private Associations” gives power to national security authorities to ban
organizations that “aggressively and belligerently oppose the constitutional order or the idea of
international understanding” (p. 39). Thus HBTG was banned in Germany for violation of this
law. Since being banned in 2003, several individual members have also been expelled from
Germany, though they have not immediately been deported due to requests for political
16
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asylum. 17 In addition, German assets of the group were frozen and 110 searches of HBTG
member apartments in Germany occurred over the course of 2003 (Schneider, 2006; Baran,
2004). HBTG filed a lawsuit against its ban in 2004; however this lawsuit was rejected by a
German court (Baran, 2004). While HBTG has been banned from participating in public
activities disseminating its viewpoints in Germany, membership in the group itself is apparently
not illegal. 18
Analysis
The evidence that I have collected clearly suggests that HBTG has experienced more repression
in Germany than has HBTA in Australia and HBTUK in the United Kingdom, respectively. The
group was already under intense scrutiny in 2002 due to revelations that one of the 9/11 hijackers
was a former pupil of an HBTG member. Thus I have coded HBTG‟s level of experienced
repression as a “2” for 2002. When the group was banned in 2003, the German government took
several significant repressive actions against the group, including prohibiting its public activities,
searching member‟s homes for evidence of further criminal activity, and planned expulsion of
several members from the country. While these actions were taken, actual membership of
individuals in the organization was technically not illegal. Furthermore, this state of de-facto
proscription has persisted despite legal challenges both within Germany and to the higher
European Court thus far. As a result, I have coded the group‟s experience in Germany as a “3”
for years 2003-2010, in recognition that legislation has been enacted and enforced to severely
limit the group‟s activities, but that individual membership in the group remains legal, and no
severe penalties (such as lengthy prison sentences) have been levied.
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Case 4: HBT in Turkey
Case overview
Hizb ut-Tahrir in Turkey (henceforth HBTT) has been officially outlawed since 1967
(Baran, 2004). Despite its proscription, HBTT has never given up on establishing itself in Turkey,
because Turkey is among the countries that the group seeks to establish Khalifah within
(Schneider, 2006; Baran, 2004). Carkoglu & Bilgili (2010: 413)‟s analysis of HBTT concludes
that most members are university-educated and are “modern in their outlook and attitudes,” but
that the group‟s appeal is limited in the relatively secular Turkey due to their anti-systemic
ideology. The group has focused its efforts on convincing Turks against supporting Turkey‟s
entering into the European Union (Baran, 2004). HBTT‟s tactics in Turkey include leafleting and
demonstrations that are organized as religious events; the official ban against HBTT has forced it
to repackage much of its activity in purely religious terms in order to avoid government
crackdowns (Schneider, 2006).
Evidence of Repression
All sources I have leveraged agree that HBTT is an outlawed group in Turkey that has
experienced systematic repression since 1967, despite its enduring claims that it is a non-vilolent
group. During 2003, Turkey arrested 93 HBTT members, including the group‟s leader at the time;
these individuals were eventually released under an amnesty law intended for members of the
violent Kurdish separatist group PKK (Baran, 2004). Cakir (2004) writes that following reform
of the Turkish penal code in 2004, HBTT members were no longer systematically arrested by the
government because of their non-violent orientation. Other sources indicate that the Turkish
government has cracked down on HBTT more recently (Ahmed & Stuart, 2009). Specifically,
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the government arrested six suspected members of the group in 200819 and over 150 suspected
members of the group in 2009.20 A statement released by Turkish police claimed that arms had
been seized during the more recent crackdown, thus suggesting the possibility that some group
members have deviated from the organization‟s official stance against violent methodologies. 21
Analysis
Less information is available about the experiences of HBTT than the other country
branches of HBT that I examine. However, all sources that I leverage agree that the group has
experienced more repression in Turkey than in Australia, the United Kingdom or even Germany.
The group‟s official proscription since 1967, coupled with the Turkish penal system prior to
Western reforms in 2004 suggests that HBTT experienced sustained law enforcement efforts
against it, and relatively onerous punishments for members. Thus I have coded the group‟s
experience for years 2002 and 2003 as a “4.” Very little information exists about the group‟s
experiences during the years 2004-2008. I was unable to find evidence that group members were
targeted or arrested; furthermore, some sources suggest that the penal reforms in 2004 led the
Turkish government to a more tolerant stance towards the group because of its non-violent nature.
However, the group has still remained officially banned during this entire period. Thus for years
2004-2007, I have coded the group‟s experience as a “3.” I have chosen to code the group‟s
experiences for 2008 and 2009 as “4” due to recent claims that the government has cracked down
on the group, coupled with the reported arrests of many suspected group members. Interestingly,
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claims by Turkish police that arms were seized from suspected HBTT members during these
crackdowns might suggest that the relatively repressive environment of Turkey has indeed
facilitated further radicalization of some HBTT members. However, I was unable to find
information about inter-organizational affiliations of group members during this time.

Summary of Case Studies
Table 1: Levels of Repression Experienced by Hizb ut-Tahrir in Four Democracies from 20022009

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

HBT
Australia
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2

HBT
UK
1
1
2
3
2
2
2
2

HBT
Germany
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

HBT
Turkey
4
4
3
3
3
3
4
4

Figure 3: Variation in Repression of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Four Democracies from 2002-2009
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